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Secularism  has  been  a  defining  norm  for  the  modern,  liberal  Indian  state.  The 
constitutionally secular Gujarat state is believed to have undergone a paradigmatic 
shift in 2002, when it supported a massacre of Muslim citizens. This essay investigates 
the empirical as well as normative state in situations of inter-religious violence. It 
traces  the  journey  of  the  secular  norm  over  a  45-year  period,  in  the  context  of 
contests over identity, political ideology and socio-political dominance. The picture 
that emerges is much more nuanced than that projected by stark pronouncements of 
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The state enjoys a unique conceptual status in the study of politics. It is pre-eminent in 
political life, and is simultaneously located in two realms: the normative-theoretical 
and the descriptive-empirical (Jayal 2001). At the normative level, the Indian state is 
based  on  liberal  democratic  constitutional  principles  that  centrally  include 
secularism
3. The term ‘secular state’ describes the relationship that exists, or which 
ought to exist, between the state and religion (Smith 1963: 177). The secular state 
guarantees individual and corporate freedom of religion, it strives to deal with the 
individual as a citizen irrespective of his/her religion, and it is not constitutionally 
connected to a particular religion (Smith 1963, in Galanter 1965: 234). The scope for 
interpretation in these features has led to a lack of consensus among academics, the 
judiciary, politicians, etc., over the implications of state secularism. Debate revolves 
around whether the secular state implies a severe aloofness from religion, a benign 
impartiality towards it, a corrective oversight of it, or a fond and equal indulgence of 
all religions (Galanter 1971: 268). Yet, many agree that public life is not to be guided 
by religious doctrines or institutions.  
 
Indian secularism of course is not without its detractors. Criticism of the concept in its 
present normative form comes from scholars such as Chatterjee, Madan and Nandy 
who believe that secularism has failed to protect minority religious groups or check 
fundamentalism; it may even have exacerbated the problems it set out to overcome 
(see in Bhargava 1998). From a very different standpoint, extreme Hindu nationalists 
who were at the fringe of Indian political thought at independence, and are now much 
more politically prominent, openly advocate Hindu rashtra or a Hindu nation-state. 
According to Hindu nationalist ideologue Golwalkar, ‘(Hindu) Religion …cannot be 
ignored in individual or public life. It must have a place in proportion to its vast 
importance in politics...’ (1939: 23-24). More recently, some Hindu nationalists have 
been building the word ‘secularism’ into their discourses on state and religion. But the 
implications of this ‘secularism’ are very different from the secularism of the Indian 
Constitution. Thus, a Hindu nationalist mouthpiece proclaims: ‘secular India cannot 
accept Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan), the Hindu India too cannot, and the secular 
India is the Hindu India’ (Balashankar 2005: 2). The building of a Hindu rashtra or 
the inconsistent ‘secular’ Hindu supremacist India would require key amendments in 
India’s  Constitution.  Similarly,  a  re-conceptualisation  or  abandonment  of  current 
secular ideals as suggested by academic critics would involve a normative-intellectual 
exercise, which is not the brief of this paper. Indeed, at independence in 1947, state 
secularism may have been imperative for India. The country was faced with a society 
where ascriptive identities of caste, religion and region ran deep. The only way the 
modern state could have functioned in this empirical set-up was if it rose to function 
and govern above India’s various social distinctions. At the normative level then, the 
conception of secularism adopted by the Indian state conveyed an implicit denial of 
the state’s embeddedness in society (Jayal 2001: 9, 102). A conceptualisation of the 
state benignly disposed towards, but equidistant from all religions, informs the idea of 
secularism adopted in this paper.  
                                                
3 The word ‘secular’ does not appear in India’s Constitution till 1976. However, the ideal of the 
secular state is embodied in this document from the inception of the republic in 1950. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 3     
   
In stark juxtaposition with the normative conceptualisation of the state, are reams of 
commentaries on the empirical role of the state in the massacre of up to 2000
4 people, 
predominantly Muslims, in the western Indian province of Gujarat in February-April 
2002.  Many  perceive  ‘Gujarat  2002’  as  a  turning  point.  This  is  not  necessarily 
because  the  province  witnessed  widespread,  systematically  organised  communal
5 
violence. Post-independence India has seen several bouts of Hindu-Muslim violence 
in  Jabalpur  (1961),  Bhiwandi,  Jalgaon  and  Malad  (1970),  Jamshedpur  (1979), 
Moradabad (1980), Jaipur (1990), Ayodhya, Bombay and other Indian cities after the 
destruction of the Babri mosque by Hindu fundamentalists (1992), etc. To many, the 
distinguishing factor of the Gujarat violence is the openly partisan role of the state, 
headed  by  a  Hindu  nationalist  BJP  government
6.  The  communal  actions  of  the 
Gujarati state are seen as a threat to the concept of the modern secular Indian state 
established  at  independence  (Mehta  2002).  Gujarat  2002  is  even  perceived  as 
representing a ‘paradigm shift’ in the nature of the state (Bidwai 2002). While the 
unsecular role of the state in Gujarat 2002 has been portrayed as unprecedented, a 
cursory survey of recent history leads one to qualify this claim. The post-colonial 
Indian state has not constantly practised secularism. Literature on police partiality and 
administrative leniency to co-religionists in different parts of India, especially in times 
of communal violence abounds (see Akbar 1991, Basu 1997, Engineer and Shakir 
1985, Engineer 1988, 1991). This paper then asks: how is Gujarat 2002 paradigmatic?  
 
The paper adopts a socio-historical perspective of the Gujarati state and politics. In 
tracing the progress of the secular norm, it studies the state’s behaviour in episodes of 
communal violence. The period being examined is  from 1960, when Gujarat  was 
carved out from the larger Bombay province, Saurashtra and Kachchh, to the present. 
Throughout the essay, I will analytically differentiate between the Gujarati state at the 
normative and empirical levels. The former includes pronouncements of state actors 
on  subjects  related  to  secularism  and  religious  identity,  as  well  as  categorical 
conceptualisations of the ‘communal’. Labels and pronouncements about secularism 
and communalism deserve academic attention for two reasons. One, they represent 
what  state  actors  think  and  believe,  and  may  reflect  underlying  principles.  Two, 
                                                
4  The  Gujarat  government  claims  there  were  851  deaths  during  the  riots. Unofficial,  but  widely 
accepted estimates, put the toll at over 2,000 (Human Rights Watch 2004: 1). Recently, the Congress 
government in Delhi declared in Parliament that 1044 people- 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus- were 
killed in the 2002 violence (Times of India, May 13, 2005a).  
5 Here, ‘communal’ does not imply belonging to a body of citizens, which has positive connotations. 
‘Communal’ in the Indian context generally refers to the exclusive identification with and commitment 
to  one’s  religious  or  social  community  (Rudolph  and  Rudolph  1987).  Despite  problems  of 
essentialisation, the word is used because of a discursive history unavailable to other words. 
6  The  BJP  (Bharatiya  Janata  Party/Indian  People’s  Party)  is  ideologically  and  organisationally 
affiliated to a large complex of Hindu Right organisations. The Sangh Parivar (family of organisations) 
includes at its core the centralised and authoritarian RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak  Sangh/National 
Volunteer  Corps,  founded  1924).  Mid-twentieth  century,  the  RSS  created  several  off-shoot 
organisations like the women’s wing- Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (1936), the ABVP (Akhil Bharatiya 
Vidyarthi  Parishad/All  India  Students  Federation,  1948),  the  Jan  Sangh  (1951)-  the  political-
parliamentary arm of the Hindu Right and precursor of the current BJP (1980), and the VHP (Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad/World Hindu Council, 1964), the cultural-political mobilisation wing. The Hindu Right 
is driven by the Hindu nationalist philosophy- ‘Hindutva’, highly  visible in India from the 1980s. 
Hindutva is predicated on the idea that the Indian state, social formation and civil society should be 
reorganized along exclusively ‘Hindu’ precepts. Resurgent Hindu nationalism, which asserts the need 
for non-Hindus to demonstrate unconditional obeisance to the strong Hindu nation, has resulted in 
highly organised violence against Muslim and Christian minorities in India during the 1990s (Bhatt and 
Mukta 2000).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 4     
   
formal  statements  about  communalism,  declarations  before  judicial  commissions, 
government affidavits explaining communal violence, etc. are in keeping with the 
official face the state would like to project. This image would correspond to what the 
state ought to be like- i.e., the normative state. A study of the empirical state traces the 
state’s actions in situations of communal violence. The state unpacked along a not 
necessarily contiguous empirical-normative dimension will bring out the continuities 
as  well  as  significant  changes  in  the  Gujarati  state’s  relationship  with  the 
constitutional secular ideal over 5 decades. The picture that emerges is much more 
nuanced than that suggested by stark conceptualisations of the radical shift from state 
secularism  to  communalism  that  have  been  drawn  by  most  journalistic  and  even 
academic  writing  emerging  from  the  carnage  of  Gujarat  2002.  Based  on  DPhil 
fieldwork in Gujarat between December 2003 and January 2005, my data sources 
include  communal  riot
7  reports  produced  by  judicial  and  citizens’  commissions, 
media  accounts  of  the  state’s  role  during  communal  violence,  interviews  with 
politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, academics, social activists, and members of caste 
and religious associations, as well as Hindu nationalist propaganda documents. Owing 
to the sensitive nature of much of the data presented in this paper, the identities of 
some of the interviewees has not been revealed in the following pages. 
 
 
2. The 1969 Hindu-Muslim violence: event, empirical practices and the 
normative state 
 
Gujarat was not affected by post-partition violence that hit northern and eastern India 
around  1947.  Government  sources  record  ‘minor  incidents  involving  Hindus  and 
Muslims’ in 1958, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, but the State witnessed its first 
major communal conflagration in September 1969 (Reddy 1970: 46). The violence 
involving  injury  and  destruction  of  life,  commercial  and  residential  property,  and 
religious places, lasted from September 18 to September 30 1969. After the riots, the 
Government of Gujarat constituted a Commission of Inquiry. According to the Reddy 
Commission, named after the Supreme Court Judge who was the Chair, the violence 
was triggered off by an alleged attack on the Hindu Jagannath temple by Muslim 
worshippers at a nearby dargah (shrine). The latter had been disturbed by animals that 
belonged to the temple. Preceding this incident, several ‘minor incidents’, such as a 
rally by Gujarati Muslims to protest Israel’s desecration of the Al Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem had created some tension in the State. This tension was exacerbated by the 
exaggerated reporting of ‘communal incidents’ by vernacular newspapers, as well as 
by propaganda pamphlets published by Hindu nationalist organisations. In fact, during 
the build-up to the violence, the Jan Sangh supported the founding of a Hindu Dharma 
Raksha Samiti (HDRS, Committee for the Protection of the Hindu Religion). Many 
HDRS  members,  who  were  usually  also  Jan  Sangh  and/or  RSS  members,  were 
involved in the ensuing ‘riots’. At least 660 casualties are officially recorded for this 
period in Ahmedabad city alone. 6742 properties were attacked; of which 671 were 
Hindu properties and 6071 belonged to Muslims. 93 Muslim places of worship were 
damaged or completely destroyed (Reddy 1970: 179-80). The violence of 1969 was 
grave enough for the Commission to state that ‘the damage caused to life and property 
by the holocaust borne of communal hatred … is unprecedented’ (Reddy 1970: 211). 
                                                
7  The  word  ‘riot’  implies  spontaneous  violence  between  two  groups.  Often,  ‘riots’  in  India  are 
systematically organised programmes by a more powerful group against another. Yet, the discursive 
history of this problematic term describing inter-religious violence keeps it in circulation.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 5     
   
In  discussing  the  empirical  role  of  the  state  in  the  1969  violence,  the  Reddy 
Commission concentrated on the generally ‘infirm and indecisive’ behaviour of the 
police (1970: 153). Police failed to turn up when asked to stop or arrest marauding 
crowds, usually citing lack of forces. When the police did arrive, they either dispersed 
crowds or curiously found that large mobs sometimes numbering 2000 and more had 
‘disappeared’.  In  the  case  of  the  complete  destruction  of  a  Muslim  commercial 
establishment  situated  opposite  a  police  station  for  instance,  even  senior  police 
supervisors failed to make arrests. Nor did they use firearms to prevent the crowd 
from burning property. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and his troops made a 
lathi (baton) charge, and being outnumbered, withdrew (Reddy 1970: 152). Police 
inaction  in  1969  becomes  even  more  apparent  when  one  notes  that  curfew  was 
imposed two and a half days after the beginning of mass violence. Even after this 
delay, which is severely criticised by the Reddy Commission, it was observed more in 
the breach. The Commission’s evidence revealed ‘a picture of roaming crowds of 
hundreds and thousands doing mischief without hindrance’ (1970: 126). In the few 
arrests  that  were  made  for  breach  of  curfew,  Muslims  outnumbered  Hindus.  For 
instance, on the night curfew was first imposed- September 20 1969, 50 Hindus and 
82 Muslims were arrested (Reddy 1970: 127). These figures are grossly skewed given 
that in the 1961 census, Muslims were 8.1 per cent of Gujarat’s total population of 
20.63 million, whereas Hindus were 88.9 per cent (Census of Gujarat 2001). In its 
critical conclusion about the role of the police in the 1969 violence, the Commission 
stated- 
The lack of firmness…. to deal with rioters and crowds, the failure to 
round-up  and  arrest  miscreants,  …  political  workers  and  communal 
minded  persons…the  ineffective  manner  of  counteracting  rumours, 
ineffective patrolling and the lack of timely information of mobs poised 
to  create  riots,  the  break-down  of  the  Special  Branch  to  get 
information… the reluctance…to use effective force and fire power on 
the crowds who were indulging in riots, failure to appreciate the need to 
call the army earlier….when it became evident that sufficient force was 
not available….The police, in our opinion, were caught napping and 
became  confused  and  had  misappreciated…the  seriousness  of  the 
situation…Whilst stating so, we cannot also countenance the suggestion 
that all this was permitted to be done either by the Government or by 
the police deliberately to enable the… genocide of Muslims.  
- Reddy et al 1970: 214 (emphasis added) 
Recorded above is the empirical performance of the state in 1969. The Commission of 
Inquiry criticised the pro-Hindu stances of some police officials, including a few who 
allegedly deliberately shot at Muslims (Reddy 1970: 193). However, it was firm that 
the state and police on the whole were not biased. It can be culled from the above that 
the Commission did not see the empirical state as having strayed from the secular 
norm. Whether it could enforce this norm on people in the maintenance of order in a 
multi-religious society is another question. Viewed in a wider theoretical framework, 
the Reddy Commission was pointing towards the ‘softness’ of the Gujarati state. That 
is, a state in which ‘policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted at 
all’ (Myrdal 1968: 66). The authorities in a soft state may frame policies or declare 
norms  that  must  govern  the  state.  However,  they  are  then  reluctant  to  place  the 
obligations of these frameworks on the people of the nation.  
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The  Commission  of  Inquiry  based  its  conclusions  on  physical  evidence  and  state 
actions.  The  testimonies  of  state  and  other  witnesses  are  relegated  to  several 
appendices. These however, tell an important story. Part of this story is the selective 
inclusion of events as having contributed to the 1969 violence, and the labelling of 
certain phenomena as ‘anti-national’, which illuminates the nature of the normative 
state. When the Advocate General opened the case of the government regarding the 
1969 violence, he set out certain incidents that immediately preceded it. The RSS 
camp in December 1968, attended by 1600 people including organisation head M.S. 
Golwalkar, is not one of these. Nor is the controversial speech of Jan Sangh leader 
Balraj  Madhok  in  September  1969,  which  had  called  for  the  ‘Bharatiyakaran’ 
(Indianisation) of Muslims. In fact, the government submitted a ten-page note to the 
Reddy  Commission  indicating  the  ‘perversity’  of  believing  that  Madhok’s  speech 
added to communal tensions in Ahmedabad (Reddy 1970: 71). Like the Advocate 
General, in later cross-examinations, senior police officials expressed no knowledge 
about the general anti-Muslim activities of the RSS, Jan Sangh, etc. It even took the 
Reddy Commssion to point out that enough evidence existed to suggest that RSS and 
Jan Sangh members had been seen before and during the riots with voters’ lists that 
were used to target Muslim properties (1970: 51, 196). Compared to this nonchalant 
attitude towards highly communal Hindu Right organisations, representatives of the 
police, the ruling political party and the Advocate General repeatedly termed activities 
of Muslims ‘aggressive’ and their activities ‘anti-national’. The discussion before the 
Commission about the nature of the Al Aqsa procession in Ahmedabad city is a case 
in point. The procession was taken out in Ahmedabad on August 31 1969. It was the 
case of the Advocate General (and of the right wing Jan Sangh) that the shouting of 
‘anti-national slogans’ in it created tension that contributed to the September 1969 
violence (Reddy 1970: 55, Appendix III: 21). Even a leader of the Congress Party, 
K.G.  Prabhu  indicated  to  the  Commission  that  the  Al  Aqsa  slogans  were  ‘anti-
national’  and  the  procession  created  doubts  in  the  mind  of  the  majority  (Hindu) 
community about ‘the way the government is leading us’ (in Reddy 1970: 55). The 
‘anti-national’ nature of the Al Aqsa slogans was refuted by Subodh Mehta of the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) and by the Police Commissioner of Ahmedabad, 
both of whom had witnessed the procession (Reddy 1970: 55). According to them, the 
slogans that were shouted were ‘jo Islam se takrayega dunia se mit jayega’ (whoever 
confronts Islam will be obliterated from the world), ‘Muslim ekta zindabad’ (long live 
Muslim unity), ‘ham masjido ki towhin bardasht nahin kar sakte’ (we cannot bear the 
insult  of  mosques)  (Reddy  1970:  54).  The  Commission  agreed  with  the  latter 
interpretation, adding that the procession was peaceful
8.  
 
In the Al-Aqsa case, some officials at decision-making levels of the police evinced an 
anti-Muslim bias, whereas others chose to project a more balanced opinion. The space 
for open disagreement is evident. The latter is also visible in differences of opinion 
                                                
8 The illiberal views about the Al Aqsa incident held by many state actors and politicians are reflected 
in an article that appeared in a widely circulated Gujarati newspaper on September 7 1969, 11 days 
before the start of the 1969 violence. Titled ‘Al Aqsa Episode and the Muslims of India’, it indicated 
that Indian Muslims had expressed greater anger about the Al Aqsa incident than had Muslims in 
Islamic countries like Pakistan. This was undesirable and Muslims in India should ‘understand the 
limitations  as  citizens  of  a  secular  state  like  India’.  Moreover,  ‘while  different  Indian  citizens- 
Muslims, communists (!) have international loyalties, Hindus have none. Hence their citizenship is 
superior’ (Vasudev Mehta in Gujarat Samachar, in Reddy 1970: 56, emphasis added).  
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between  field  and  supervisory  police  officials  over  the  ‘role  of  Muslims’  in  the 
‘attack’ on the Jagannath temple, which supposedly set off the riots. In their testimony 
before the Commission, three sub-inspectors who were in the vicinity of the temple on 
the day, gave the Commission highly exaggerated accounts of Muslim ‘aggressors’ 
pouring acid on priests and attacking them with knives, scythes, etc (Reddy 1970: 85-
86). The Inspector General of Police and the Superintendant of Police of Ahmedabad 
refuted this ‘evidence’ based on forensic reports and first person accounts. They also 
issued a press statement to quell rumours about the ‘Muslim attack’ on the Jagannath 
temple,  which  some  police  field  officials  were  propagating  along  with  Hindu 
fundamentalists (Reddy 1970: 84-90). Even as many individuals, at different levels of 
the state hierarchy showed anti-Muslim biases, the state as a whole, especially senior 
officials  and  politicians,  seemed  keen  to  publicly  project  an  image  of  secular 
equidistance (siding with one or another community is more evident in documents 
such as affidavits, which are not public). For instance, when the holy book Ramayan 
was allegedly desecrated by a Muslim police officer in September 1969, some priests 
approached  the  Congress  Party  and  the  Jan  Sangh  for  support  in  launching  a 
campaign to suspend this official from service. A larger case was made about the 
general ‘insult’ to Hinduism through this incident. However, both political parties 
were reluctant to get openly involved. While the Jan Sangh helped set up a front 
organisation- the Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti- to conduct the Ramayan campaign 
and  support  the  ensuing  riots, individual  members  from  the  Congress encouraged 
priests and HDRS activists on protest fasts. As a party, the Congress stayed away 
(Reddy 1970: 57-58). The existence of the constitutional secular norm seems to have 
dissuaded political parties and senior state officials from openly siding with one or 
other religion. 
 
To  conclude,  both  at  the  empirical  and  normative  levels,  different  actors  in  the 
Gujarati state appear more or less committed to secularism around 1969. Some were 
clearly biased in favour of Hindus. Yet, the Reddy Commission did not proclaim the 
state  to  be  unsecular-  even  as  it  universally  reprimanded  it  for  negligence  in 
preventing and controlling the communal riots. There are several reasons for this. (a) 
The multilayered nature of the state leads to differences in perception depending on 
the facet of the state that one chooses to observe. The state can be analysed at an 
empirical and/or normative level. The Reddy Commission chose to concentrate on the 
former. Thus, its findings tended towards physical evidence of state failures, which 
were then construed as inefficiency and softness, rather than complicity and lack of 
commitment to the secular norm. (b) The Commission perceived the pro-Hindu biases 
of  state  actors  as  individual  aberrations,  not  systematic  maladies.  ‘The  state  as  a 
whole’ was deemed secular. After all, it was not the Reddy Commission’s brief to 
question whether India is a secular state or not. The point from which the Commission 
proceeded was that it is. (c) Despite evidence of embedded unsecular biases, a case 
can  be  made  that  the  formal  existence  of  secular  norms  prevented  the  state  and 
political parties from publicly projecting the communal biases of individual members. 
Given  this  formal  adherence  to  secularism,  the  Commission’s  conclusion  is  not 
entirely incorrect. (d) The Commission would have been aware that the secular norm 
lent  legitimacy  to  several  state  actors’  practice.  This  is  so  for  the  state  during 
communal  riots  and  in  everyday  situations.  As  an  illustration  of  the  latter,  my 
interviews with district level officials indicate that in the 1960s and 70s, they could 
insist that pictures of Hindu deities be removed from the walls of public offices in 
Gujarat without being attacked for being ‘anti-Hindu’ or ‘anti-Gujarat’. This space to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 8     
   
put secular equality into practice in a deeply religious society and a highly embedded 
state was possible because of the legitimacy provided by secular norms. This space 
shrank in the 1990s, as will be discussed later. These four points indicate that the 
Reddy  Commission’s  conclusion  of  state  inefficiency  despite  commitment  to 
secularism can  be problematised through nuanced analysis;  however,  it  cannot be 
rejected  as  completely  inaccurate.  On  receiving  the  report  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry, the Government of Gujarat refused to accept the specific empirical findings 
that  suggested  that  the  police  had  failed  in  their  duty  to  prevent  riots  or  protect 
Muslims during them (Government of Gujarat 1971). It would appear that just as the 
existence of the norm enabled some state actors to build secular principles into their 
administrative practices, the state’s formal commitment to secularism provided it with 
the leeway to not investigate suggestions that state secularism was not always evident 
during the violence of 1969.  
 
 
3. Between fuzzy secularism and Hindu rashtra: political tumult, identity-
construction, and effects on the state 
 
By the 1990s, the state’s previous, fuzzy commitment to secularism had given way to 
a  shrinking  space  for  secularism  in  the  vision  and  programmes  of  the  state.  To 
appreciate this shift, studying the 1970s and 80s is crucial. One will see struggles over 
identity, political dominance and socio-political ideology that have set the context for 
attempts to turn Gujarat into a Hindu rashtra. The 1970s and 80s were a period of 
intense political turmoil for Gujarat, with significant consequences for the nature of 
the state. In 1969, the Congress party, India’s main democratic political formation 
split. In Gujarat, the division was between the upper caste, conservative old guard of 
the  Congress  (Organisation)  and  Mrs.  Indira  Gandhi’s  ostensibly  modernising, 
secular, socialism-professing Congress (Requisition). With much of the established 
leadership in the Congress (O), Mrs. Gandhi set about building a mass based party 
through  populist  appeals.  She  coined  the  brilliant  slogan  ‘garibi  hatao’  (remove 
poverty)  that  brought  her  to  power  as  Prime  Minister  in  1971.  From  the  mid-
seventies, under her guidance, a distinct pattern of putting forth populous backward 
caste and minority religious candidates on Congress tickets emerged in Gujarat. By 




11 and Muslims. The Congress (I) put up 
KHAM candidates in 111 out of the 182 available seats, and got 96, or 86.5 per cent 
elected. In June 1980, a Congress (I) government was sworn in under Madhavsinh 
Solanki,  a  backward  caste  Kshatriya.  Only  five  Solanki  Cabinet  members  had 
previous ministerial experience, and many represented hitherto disadvantaged groups. 
KHAM leaders also dominated the 95 patronage structures like government boards 
and commissions (Sheth 1998: 27). KHAM of course, was more than just an electoral 
strategy engineered in Delhi or the Gujarat capital. It represented the widening of 
                                                
9 The ‘Kshatriya’ group was actually an electoral combine of higher caste Rajputs and Darbars, and 
numerically powerful lower castes such as Kolis. 
10  Harijans,  ‘the  children  of  God’,  are  India’s  former  ‘untouchables’.  Also  known  as  ‘Dalits’ 
(downtrodden), they are recognised as Scheduled Castes (SCs) by the state. The British Government 
first prepared a ‘schedule’ of socially deprived ‘untouchable’ castes in 1935, to increase representation 
in legislatures, government employment, and university placement. 
11  Adivasi,  ‘original  inhabitant’,  refers  to  India’s  indigenous  communities.  Many  Adivasi 
communities are part of a ‘schedule’ that entitles them to compensatory treatment similar to SCs. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 9     
   
political  space  through  the  democratic  electoral  process.  It  reflected  as  well  as 
encouraged the aspirations for socio-political mobility and power of several groups.  
 
A sense of alienation created by three phenomena- loss of political power, perceived 
potential  loss  of  social  dominance  and  loss  of  control  over  state  structures  of 
economic  and  political  patronage-  propelled  Gujarat’s  savarnas  (upper  castes), 
hitherto divided politically, to aggressively support two anti-reservation agitations in 
1981 and 1985. These were elite revolts against the Congress-led State government’s 
decision to implement 21 per cent reservation for Dalits and 28 per cent for Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs) in government jobs and education. The violence of 1985, 
for instance, began as an agitation of upper caste college students against reservations 
for OBCs. It was soon taken over by the student wing of the Sangh Parivar- the 
ABVP, and by other upper caste Hindu groups. It then became a general movement 
against lower castes and Muslims. To instigate members, upper caste associations 
such as Patel Sabhas issued circulars to members to attack lower castes and Muslims 
and ‘teach them a lesson’ for daring to aspire to positions that had until then been the 
domain  of  the  Brahmins,  Banias  and  Patidars  (Narayanpura  Patel  Yuvak  Mandal 
1985, in Dave 1990: Annexure VII 22). We also know that prominent members of the 
Gujarat BJP were actively involved in initiating violence against Dalits in 1981 and 
Dalits  and  Muslims  in  1985  (Dave  1990:  139).  The  idea  of  the  anti-reservation 
agitation was not just to persecute a supposedly aggrandising ‘other’- Dalit in 1981, 
Dalit and then Muslim in 1985; it was also to oust the KHAM government from 
power. The 1985 ‘riots’ that killed 210 Dalits and Muslims subsided only with the 
forced resignation of Chief Minister Solanki.  
 
During both the 1981 and 1985 anti-reservation agitations, the Brahmin-Bania-Patidar 
combine acquired a savarna unity. The latter had become important in the face of the 
KHAM  groups’  social  and  political  mobility,  and  because  rapid  urbanisation  and 
breakdown of traditional settlement and occupational patterns had reduced the social 
security offered by individual caste associations (Nandy et al 1995: 103). The Sangh 
Parivar,  with  its  unifying  Hindutva  ideology,  and  political  ambition  to  oust  the 
Congress, became an anchor for the savarna combine. It soon realised that savarna 
identity  politics  would  not  attract  more  than  a  quarter  of  Gujarat’s  votes
12.  The 
KHAM  identity  on  the  other  hand  united  70-75  per  cent  of  Gujarat’s  population 
(Sanghavi 1996). Clearly, the Savarna identity would be inadequate for taking over 
political  power. With  this  realisation,  the  Parivar  started  promoting  an  alternative 
socio-political identity- that based on a constructed ‘Hindu’ unity that included lower 
castes, former ‘untouchable outcastes’ and Adivasis. This new identity poached on a 
large part of the KHAM constituency. Several methods were used from 1983-84 to 
build a wide Hindu constituency. For instance, Dalits were invited to attend Hindu 
religious programmes such as Rath Yatras (chariot processions of deities), till then 
closed  to  ‘untouchables’.  Youth  groups  were  organised  in  which  the  VHP  asked 
young people to dedicate themselves to the abolition of untouchability and to work for 
the  all-round  development  of  their  ‘economically  and  socially  backward  Hindu 
brothers’  (1986).  Schools  began  to  be  built  in  remote  Adivasi  areas  to propagate 
Brahmanical Hindu culture. In fact, towards the end of the 1985 ‘anti-reservation’ 
                                                
12 At the turn of the twentieth century, Brahmins, Banias and Kanbis/Patidars numbered 5.75, 6.06 
and 15.62 percent of Gujarat’s population respectively (Bombay Gazetteers 1899, in Sanghavi 1996: 
64). Since no caste-based censuses have been carried out in independent India, only approximate caste 
figures based on earlier censuses are available today. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 10     
   
agitation,  under  the  orchestration  of  the  Sangh  Parivar,  most  of  the  victims  were 
Muslims, not Dalits or OBCs. That the Hindu unity strategy was being operationalised 
is also evident from a bout of communal violence during a Rath Yatra in 1986 in 
Ahmedabad,.  This  episode  witnessed  Dalits  and  Muslims  fighting  each  other,  a 
significant  change  from  the  1981  anti-Dalit  violence  in  which  they  had  shown 
solidarity. One of the reasons for the Parivar’s success in mobilising lower castes 
could be the apparent capacity of Hindutva to provide an easy channel for upward 
social  mobility  and  respect  within  Hindu  society  (Nandy  et  al  1995).  Electorally, 
given the BJPs political success from 1990, the Hindu unity strategy had paid off. 
Quite on the other hand, after the death of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the sidelining of 
KHAM leaders from 1985, the Congress entered a new post-KHAM phase. Its new 
leadership pandered to the interests of Gujarat’s upper castes and middle class to stay 
in power. There is little evidence of political ideology or concerns about social uplift 
in the ‘new Congress’. 
 
The struggle between the political dominance of the KHAM and the Hindu identities, 
and the elite revolt this generated, is only one part of the story of Gujarat in the 1970s 
and 80s. Another part of this story is the changing nature of the state at the local and 
central legislative level, and at that of bureaucratic administration. It is well accepted 
that Indira Gandhi’s Congress underwent a process of de-institutionalisation in the 
1970s and 80s (Kohli 1990). Party election candidates and leaders were chosen not by 
consensus, as in previous decades, but based on the Party President’s preferences. The 
over-centralisation  and  de-institutionalisation  of  politics  in  the  ruling  party  had  a 
significant impact on the wider state apparatus. Bureaucrats serving in Gujarat in this 
period recall that many of the Congress party’s legislators were without local political 
roots.  They  needed  to  dispel  much  more  state  patronage  in  order  to  keep  their 
electoral  majorities.  One  such  form  of  patronage  was  the  granting  of  secure 
government  jobs in local offices, corporations, etc. and the  transfer  of unyielding 
officials away from a particular legislator’s or party worker’s constituency. In turn, 
the  shaky  State  leadership  was  compelled  to  agree  with  many  more  ‘unofficial’ 
requests from local politicians and party factions than before. The increase in arbitrary 
grants  of  state  patronage  to  political  supporters,  and  caste  and  community 
campaigners,  paved  the  way  for  the  takeover  and  further  development  of  de-
institutionalised, arbitrary, quid pro quoist channels of state functioning by Hindutva 
groups  when  they  came  to  power
13.  Interestingly,  Hindu  religious  sects  were 
significant recipients of state patronage in this period. For instance, newer sects that 
target middle castes and some lower castes in the latter’s search for social mobility, 
were used to campaign in elections- though not on as large a scale as they are today 
under the BJP. In return, the religious groups got state land at highly subsidised rates, 
ready access to the corridors of power, etc. The de-institutionalisation of politics and 
administration further reduced the ability and willingness of the state to operationalise 
norms such as secularism in everyday governance.  
 
Supported by the Sangh Parivar, the BJP made significant inroads into the local power 
structures of the Gujarati state apparatus from the early 80s. This provided the base 
for  the  party’s  complete  takeover  of  political  and  state  power  in  the  1990s.  The 
infiltration of Sangh Parivar ideology and people into the local power structures of 
                                                
13 Based on interviews with 5 Indian Administrative Service officers, 1 Indian Audit and Accounts 
Service officer, and 2 RSS office bearers in Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad and Surat, July 2004-January 
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Gujarat began with the party’s first major electoral triumph in 1983 when it captured 
the Rajkot Municipal Corporation. Then, after the anti-reservation riots of 1985 and 
communal  riots  of  1985  and  1986,  the  BJP  gained  control  of  the  Ahmedabad 
Municipal  Corporation  in  1987.  The  infiltration  of  local  power  structures  did  not 
happen overnight of course. In the 1987 District Panchayat elections, the weakened 
Congress was still able to win 50.7 percent of the votes, whereas the BJP got 14.4 per 
cent. Only after 1995 did the BJP make a clean sweep of elections in local self-
government institutions ranging from Municipalities to District, Block and Village 
Panchayats (Yagnik and Sud 2004: 5). However, the placing of Hindutva supporters 
as personnel in different levels of the state apparatus (and in para-statal organisations 
such as cooperative societies and banks) had begun from the early to mid-80s. It is not 
just that the BJP appointed new people when it took over power in local government 
bodies. The 1981 and 1985 anti-reservation agitations had turned a lot of upper caste 
government employees against the Congress government, and its ostensible support of 
social justice and secularism. In fact, upper and middle caste government employees 
had gone on mass strike in 1985 against the reservation policy (Dave 1990). Many of 
these employees became formal supporters of the BJP from the mid-80s and willingly 
implemented its anti-secular policies.  
 
 
4. Communal violence in 1985-1990: the complicit inefficient empirical state, and 
ostensible normative secularism 
 
The Sangh Parivar and its ideology of Hindutva- the anti-thesis of secularism, began 
to take over Gujarat’s state and politics from the mid-1980s. Hindutva programmes, 
popular  from  1982-83,  became  a  primary  means  of  ascent.  Most  Parivar 
mobilisations- celebrations of festivals such as Ganesh Chaturthi, youth conventions, 
Hindutva camps and Yatras- resulted in Hindu-Muslim violence. For instance, Hindus 
and Muslims clashed in 1986 during the Rath Yatra, and in 1987 over the Ram-Janki 
Shobha  Yatra.  The  1987  violence  spread  from  Ahmedabad  city  to  Kheda  and 
Sabarkantha districts- an indication of the widening reach of the Parivar. 1989 saw 
Hindus-Muslim violence in Banaskantha, Panchmahal, Mehsana, Kheda and Bharuch 
districts over the Ramshila Pujan Shobha Yatra. This Yatra involved the worship of 
bricks for the proposed Ram temple at Ayodhya, in place of the Babri mosque. It was 
conducted  even  in  remote  parts  of  Gujarat  (Nandy  et  al  1995:  121-123).  By  one 
account, in the latter half of the 1980s, Gujarat witnessed around 1000 small and large 
communal incidents, with almost 1300 deaths (Desai 2002). While the Sangh Parivar 
grew from strength to strength, the Congress government looked away. Even when 
violence  broke  out  during  Hindutva  programmes,  government  interventions  were 
largely ineffective. According to a media report from Virpur town in central Gujarat 
where 4 persons were killed and 120 houses and shops set on fire on 10 April 1987 in 
the wake of the Ram Janki Shobha Yatra, ‘a small posse of police personnel was hard 
pressed  to  control  the  violence’.  In  fact,  ‘the  mob  turned  its  wrath  (on)to  the 
police…Fire tenders…were prevented from reaching the site of the arson….people 
erected  barricades  on  the  way…resorted  to  heavy  stoning  of  the  fire  brigade 
personnel’ (Hindustan Times 1987). Like the judicial commission verdict about the 
role of the state in the 1969 violence, one can conclude that a weak Congress and a 
soft state did not have the wherewithal to stop mass Hindutva mobilisations that were 
openly anti-Muslim. This however, will be a resort to the state ‘inefficiency’ trope, 
based only on a study of the empirical state. The next paragraph attempts to highlight QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 12     
   
the more complicit aspects of the state’s role in the communalisation of Gujarat from 
the mid-eighties.  
 
The violence of the mid and late 1980s was predictable; its occurrence was widely 
publicised  by  its  orchestrators.  Anti-Muslim  and  anti-state  leaflets  were  openly 
distributed by Hindutva organisations like the VHP and Bajrang Dal before yatras and 
festivals,  and  deeply  divisive  speeches  were  made.  Muslims  were  termed  ‘anti-
national’,  ‘treacherous’  and  ‘aggressive’,  and  people  were  asked  to  boycott  them 
economically. Hindus were asked to unite and fight the anti-Hindu government and 
those who were constantly attacking Hindu society and culture (VHP 1986; Jat, Patel 
and Parmar c. 1987). What is more, before one of its largest mobilisation efforts- the 
Ram Janki Shobha Yatras of 1987, the VHP distributed pamphlets openly challenging 
the Indian Constitution. Aa prashne Hindu samaaj bandharaniya maarge balidano 
aapva sajaj thayel che (On the question of building the Ram temple in Ayodhya, 
Hindu  society  is  equipped  to  sacrifice  the  path  of  the  Constitution)  (VHP  1987). 
Despite these challenges to the state, and offensive propaganda against Muslims, the 
programmes that the latter pamphlets announced were allowed to go ahead. Even 
though the media regularly predicted violence in the wake of Hindutva events, the 
state  apparatus  at  the  highest  levels  repeatedly  claimed  ‘lack  of  foreknowledge’ 
(Chief Minister Amarsinh Chaudhary, quoted in The Hindu 1987).  This implied that 
the police and local administration landed up at scenes of violence after much damage 
had been done (Times of India 1987, Indian Express 1987). During a particularly 
violent  Ramshila  Pujan  in  1989,  after  180  towns  and  villages  had  witnessed 
communal  violence,  Chief  Minister  Chaudhary  of  the  Congress-I  banned  that 
particular programme. The ban was ineffective and communal tension followed in 95 
more places (Nandy et al 1995: 121-123). Yet, guided by the official Constitutional 
norm of the secular state, media reports continued to describe the police and local 
state  machinery  as  ‘understaffed’  and  ‘totally  unequal  to  the  task  of  controlling 
violence once it broke out’ (Times of India 1987). Only in passing was the underlying 
cause of the ‘inefficiency’ mentioned- the Sangh Parivar had managed to convert 
most grassroots Congressmen and many local government officials to the Hindutva 
cause (Times of India 1987). This indicates not just inefficiency, but also complicity 
of the empirical state’s official  machinery and political supporters in anti-Muslim 
violence and Hindutva mobilisation.  
 
In the late 1980s, actions of the empirical state further undermined Gujarat’s fuzzy 
normative secularism. Two examples illustrate this. One, the state did not act against 
any  organisation  or  individual  for  circulating  offensive  anti-Muslim  propaganda 
documents, even though their authorship was clear. On the other hand, when a paper 
was published in a scholarly journal in 1988 on 19
th century literature produced by 
one of Gujarat’s most politically powerful Hindu sects, the state stepped in to initiate 
blasphemy proceedings against the author and journal editors. This was done because 
some priests complained to state authorities that the paper was offensive to the sect’s 
followers  (Jani  1988,  Jhaveri  1988).  Two,  while  the  state  did  nothing  to  stop 
potentially violent Hindutva processions and programmes organised by the Bajrang 
Dal and VHP, the Chief Minister himself intervened to stop Muharram processions. In 
September  1986,  he  ‘appealed’  to  (Muslim)  citizens  through  the  government’s 
Department of Information, indicating that-  
It  has  been  the  government’s  policy  to  let  each  community  celebrate 
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anticipated  to  obstruct  everyday  life,  the  government  is  forced  to  take 
unpleasant decisions. Since curfew has just been lifted from Ahmedabad (in 
July 1986, in the aftermath of violence because of the Jagannath Yatra), self-
discipline  must  be  practised  to  maintain  harmony  in  Ahmedabad  and 
Gujarat. I am appealing to you to ensure that Taziya processions are not 
taken out this Muharram.  
- Amarsinh Chaudhary 1986, translated summary of the original Gujarati 
document  
Taziya  committees  did  not  conduct  Muharram  processions  that  year  (Information 
Department 1986). In the context of Hindutva mobilisation from 1983-84, the ‘state in 
action’  had  been  soft  and  inefficient  at  some  levels,  complicit  at  others,  and 
discriminatory in its interactions with different religious groups at various rungs of its 
apparatus. 
 
Even  as  the  fuzzy  secularism  of  the  Gujarati  state  was  undermined  through  its 
empirical actions in the late 1980s, the state continued to pay lip service to the secular 
norm.  Thus,  while  following  an  inherently  ‘unsecular’  policy  of  making  Muslim 
groups  refrain  from  festive  processions,  even  as  Hindu  groups  went  ahead  with 
similar programmes, Chief Minister Chaudhary emphasised state secularism. In his 
letter to Taziya committees discussed above, he began with the words: ‘Sarvadharma 
Sambhav  (treating  all  religions  equally)  has  always  been  the  policy  of  the 
government. The state has always been dharmanirpeksha (independent of religion). 
This  is  because  lokshahi  (democracy,  literally,  the  rule  of  the  people),  samajwad 
(socialism)  and  bin  sampradayikta  (secularism)  are  the  principles  on  which  this 
government and the nation depend’ (Chaudhary 1986). Similarly, while expressing 
concern about allegations  that the Gujarat state apparatus did  not always act in a 
secular  manner,  a  judicial  commission  of  inquiry  looking  into  the  1985  ‘anti-
reservation’ violence emphasised the normative secularism of the state. ‘Even though 
our state is secular…Ministers of government when performing public functions, such 
as laying of foundation stones…perform them with Hindu religious ceremonies. …In 
schools, children are made to offer prayers according to Hindu Gods…’ (Dave 1990, 
Volume II: 25). Academics also continued to place the state in a normative secular 
framework  in  the  late  80s,  while  implying  that  the  state  in  practice  was  not 
continually secular. Thus, after the state slapped  blasphemy charges  against some 
scholars in the case discussed above, several of Gujarat’s leading academics wrote an 
open letter to the government. They indicated that ‘secular values are integral to our 
democracy. Those who believe in these values deeply, condemn the actions of the 
state’ (Joshi et al 1988). Clearly, the state was being held up against secular norms, 
even as the digressive unsecular actions of the state were criticised. However, that the 
state is located in a secular framework and should be measured against it, was taken 
for granted.  
 
Conforming to the framing of the Gujarati state in the secular norm by government 
representatives, judicial commissions and academics, Hindutva groups continued to 
work  against  the  ‘secular  state’.  These  latter  groups  were  not  just  contesting  the 
empirical state. By the latter half of the 1980s they had co-opted much of Gujarati 
politics,  and  a  fair  part  of  the  grassroots  state  machinery.  By  the  1989  national 
elections,  the  Congress  had  been  reduced  to  3  out  of  26  parliamentary  seats  in 
Gujarat. Apart from these tangible victories over the weak and sometimes communal 
Congress party and  its government, a major rallying point for the Sangh  was  the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 14     
   
state’s normative secular framework. Thus, a Sangh Parivar pamphlet from the late 
1980s announces: ‘In the name of secularism (binsampradayikta), the administration 
(vahivatitantra)  has  been  taking  Hindus  for  granted’  (VHP  1989).  Hindutva 
propaganda pamphlets from this period construe sharp distinctions between Hindutva 
versus the current politics of secularism. Thus, the Hindu Suraksha Samiti (1989) 
indicates: ‘today’s politics (rajkaran) is greatly harming Hindu dharma, culture and 
Hindutva.  This  is  why  Gujarat’s  saints  and  priests  and  Hindutva  supporters  have 
formed this samiti’. Or, ‘who will you vote for? The BJP wants to do away with ‘false 
secularism’ (dharmanirpekshata). That is the base of the Hindu people’s problems’ 
(VHP  1989).  ‘False  secularism’  and  ‘secular’  parties  like  the  Congress  are  under 
constant attack in Hindutva propaganda. As we have seen empirically however, the 
starkness between the non-sectarian actions of the state and the Congress and the 
communal actions of Hindutva is not so apparent. At the same time, at the level of 
framing principles, this stark difference is sought to be constructed- both by the state 
and by Hindutva groups. Normative secularism, however weak it may have been on 
the ground, seemed to offer both these groups a powerful legitimating discourse. 
 
The last two sections explored the politics of identity construction and the growing 
power of the  Hindutva ideology on society  and the state. The elite revolt against 
KHAM shifted savarna political opinion towards Hindu nationalism. From the mid-
80s, members of the empirical state increasingly condoned Hindu-Muslim violence 
that accompanied Hindutva mobilisation. At the same time, the formal secular norm 
continued being publicly emphasised by prominent state actors and in government 
documents. The only important political player questioning constitutional secularism 
and placing its politics in contradistinction to secularism- was the Hindu supremacist 
Sangh Parivar. In 1990, the BJP entered state government in a coalition. By 1995, it 
was  independently  in  power  in  Gujarat.  The  Gujarati  state,  which  had  undergone 
important empirical and informal normative shifts in the 1980s, now formally started 
propagating a Hindu rashtra.   
 
 
5. 1990-2002: the practices and norms of ‘Hindu rashtra’ 
 
From 1990, billboards started being erected in prominent locations in various cities 
and  towns  declaring  Gujarat  to  be  a  ‘Hindu  rashtra’
14.  BJP-controlled  local  self-
government bodies did nothing to remove them or question those who had erected 
them. Well aware of the state’s favourable disposition to them, Sangh Parivar arms 
like the VHP and Bajrang Dal that are responsible for the ‘Hindu rashtra’ boards, are 
often  heard  declaring  that  now  ‘our  government’  (amaari  sarkaar)  is  in  power
15. 
From the beginning of the process of the Gujarat state’s formal ‘Hindutvaisation’ in 
1990 till the state-sponsored massacre in 2002, Gujarat has travelled consistently on 
the path of Hindutva. This implies that the empirical Hindu rashtra has not just been 
ignoring, condoning or surreptitiously participating in acts that discriminate between 
religious groups. In the previous pages, members of the state have been shown to do 
all this from 1969 to 1989. In the last 15 years, in everyday governance and during 
communal  violence,  Hindu  rashtra  has  gone further.  Successive  BJP  governments 
have  done  little  to  distance  themselves  from  the  Sangh  Parivar  in  everyday 
                                                
14 Written in Gujarati, these boards typically read ‘Welcome to Karnavati Pradesh of Hindu rashtra’ 
or ‘You are now entering Vadodara Pradesh of Hindu rashtra’. 
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governance. In 1990, in a huge Hindutva mobilisation effort, national BJP leader L.K. 
Advani launched a Rath Yatra to popularise the cause of the Sangh Parivar-proposed 
Ram temple in Ayodhya. Communal riots between Hindus and Muslims followed in 
the  Rath’s  wake  in  many  parts  of  India.  In  Gujarat,  BJP  state  ministers  escorted 
Advani’s Rath in their official vehicles. State devices such as police wireless stations 
were  used  to  follow  the  progress  of  the  Yatra
16.  In  1990,  quite  literally,  the 
constitutionally ‘secular’ state became a vehicle of Hindu nationalism
17.  
 
The empirical state- and not just its individual members as in previous years- became 
thoroughly enmeshed with the Hindutva project of building a Hindu supremacist India 
in the 1990s. In 1997-98, for instance, the state took policy decisions that directly 
implicated  it  in  Sangh  Parivar-orchestrated  violence  against  Christians  in  Dangs, 
South  Gujarat  in  November-December  1998.  34  churches  and  2  missionary-run 
schools were damaged or destroyed in this violence, and many Christian Adivasis and 
Priests were attacked and intimidated (Chenoy 1999). In November 1997, Gujarat’s 
Social Welfare Minister sent a letter to the District Superintendent of Police (DSP), 
Dangs, asking him to conduct a survey of the number of Christians in every village in 
the district, as well as a survey of all of Dang’s churches. The DSP in turn issued a 
circular to local police stations, which asked village headmen to carry out the survey. 
The  Christian  Adivasis  and  missionaries  who  were  systematically  targeted  in  the 
violence in Dangs in 1999 suspect that their assailants got their names and addresses 
from the government (AIFOFDR 1999: 29-31). Further, in 1998-99, when the VHP 
claimed  that  Hindu  women  were  being  kidnapped  by  Muslim  youth,  the  state 
government set up a special cell to protect ‘Hindu women from atrocities meted out 
by persons of other religions’. And, when missionary-run schools remained closed to 
protest attacks on Christians in December 1998, the Gujarat State Commissioner for 
Higher Education decided to stop all government grants to them (AIFOFDR 1999: 
13). It cannot be said that all state actors had become supporters of Hindu nationalism 
by 1990. However, it can be suggested that Gujarat’s Hindu nationalist government 
actively singled out and sidelined prominent state actors who did not conform to its 
unsecular agenda. This was not always a top-down process since Hindutva ideology 
was by then entrenched in the state. Thus, when a government official attempted to 
remove  the  pictures  of  Hindu  deities  from  his  office  in  the  mid-90s  on  secular 
grounds,  the  Parivar-controlled  workers  union  of  the  state  secretariat  physically 
attacked him. He was then ‘blacklisted’ by the state’s political executive; a process 
whereby it was ensured that people such as this official never occupied a position 
from  which  they  would  be  able  to  obstruct  the  implementation  of  the  Hindutva 
agenda
18. Episodes such as this received little attention from Gujarat’s media. It seems 
to have been accepted that a hardline Hindu nationalist government would not run an 
empirically secular state. 
 
No event made the empirically unsecular nature of the Gujarati state more clear than 
the communal violence of 2002. The violence started in the aftermath of the burning 
                                                
16 Interview with Achyut Yagnik, political analyst, in Ahmedabad, November 2004 
17 The BJP was not in power in Gujarat between 1991-95 and 1996-97. However, the 1990s have seen 
a general rightward shift in politics, with politicians switching parties with ease (interview with senior 
politician who has been in the BJP, the Rashtriya Janata Party and the Congress between 1990 and 
2000, Ahmedabad, November 2004). The 1996-97 non-BJP government of the Rashtriya Janata Party 
(a BJP offshoot) was headed by a former RSS leader 
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of a  train compartment  carrying  Hindu  activists, in  Godhra town  on  February  27 
2002
19. A recent interim report by an enquiry commission headed by retired Supreme 
Court  Justice-  U.C.  Bannerjee  proclaimed  that  the  Godhra  tragedy,  in  which  58 
people died, was an accident
20. On the day of the Godhra train burning however, 
much before any systematic investigations had been carried out, the head of Gujarat’s 
political  executive, the extremist BJP Chief Minister Narendra Modi asserted that 
local Muslims had burnt the train compartment in collaboration with Pakistan’s Inter 
Services Intelligence Agency (Puniyani 2005). The BJP then pledged its support to a 
State-wide protest bandh (strike) call for the next day by the VHP. After this bandh 
call had been made, according to a Minister in the then-BJP State Cabinet, Modi 
called a meeting of senior police officers and bureaucrats on the night of February 27, 
2002.  At  this  meeting,  he  instructed  the  police  to  refrain  from  taking  any  action 
against the expected Hindu ‘reaction’
21 to the Godhra tragedy. On that same evening, 
two Cabinet Ministers of the Gujarat government had met senior functionaries of the 
Sangh Parivar. The manner and methods of unleashing violence on Muslims were 
planned in detail at this meeting. These included physical violence through burning, 
electrocution, crude and sophisticated weapons, sexual violence on Muslim women, 
the  burning  and  razing  of  Muslim  residential  and  commercial  establishments,  the 
destruction of livelihoods, economic boycott, etc. The Gujarat carnage destroyed life, 
and property worth around rupees 3800 crores
22. 272 Muslim places of worship were 
also damaged or razed (Iyer et al 2002, Vol. II: 44, 48). Many actors in the Gujarat 
state apparatus- politicians, bureaucrats and police personnel- either participated in 
the violence, or turned a blind eye towards it. The few police personnel or bureaucrats 
who  did  their  duty  in  protecting  Muslim  victims,  arresting  Hindu  attackers  or 
condemning  the  violence,  were  unceremoniously  shifted  to  inconsequential, 
powerless positions in the state hierarchy. In discussing the violence, policemen and 
local  politicians often referred to the  Godhra-revenging,  attacking Hindus as ‘us’, 
with the Muslims under attack being referred to as ‘them’ (Nussbaum 2003). Based 
on  this  kind  of  evidence,  a  citizens  tribunal  comprising  academics,  retired  civil 
servants and judges, proclaimed that ‘it appears from what happened in Ahmedabad 
and  its environs on February 28 and all over  the  state on March 1,  2 and  3 and 
thereafter, was with the deliberate connivance and support of the Government’ (Iyer 
et  al  2002,  Vol.  I:  249).  Another  commentator  indicates  that  the  unabashed 
articulation  of  a  pro-Hindu  position  by  the  Gujarati  state,  and  its  concomitant 
implication at every possible level, makes the events in Gujarat (2002) different from 
previous communal riots in India (Kabir 2002). The state of Gujarat 2002 represents 
the very opposite of the idea of secular India conceived around 1947. Not only was it 
not attempting to engage with a fuzzy secularism as in previous years, it was clearly 
acting and projecting itself as a Hindu state. 
                                                
19 See Bidwai 2002, Breman 2002,  Human Rights Watch 2002, IIJ 2003 
20 The BJP has rejected this report.  
21 The Chief Minister’s Newtonian stance of an action inviting an equal and opposite reaction has 
been criticised by many (Karat 2002, Sarkar 2002, Nussbaum 2003). By suggesting that the Gujarat 
violence of 2002 was a ‘spontaneous reaction’, Modi was undermining the detailed planning that went 
into the anti-Muslim pogrom. He was also suggesting that the Godhra tragedy was somehow the doing 
of all Gujarati Muslims who then had to face the ‘reaction’ of all Hindus. In this spontaneous mass 
reaction thesis, the state’s inaction during the violence gets condoned. That is, the reaction was so 
sudden, emotional and widespread that the state could do little to bring about order; in fact Hindu 
functionaries of the state themselves got swept into the ‘spontaneous reaction’. 
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It would seem facile to wonder about the status of the secular constitutional norm in 
Gujarat’s nascent Hindu rashtra. The actions of the empirical state, and the Hindutva 
ideology  that  drives  its  political  executive,  appear  to  have  made  constitutional 
secularism insignificant. This point was emphasised by a Gujarat bureaucrat when he 
said, ‘in this state dispensation, it would be unthinkable to, say, give state land to a 
Muslim religious trust, if there is even a less eligible Hindu religious trust competing. 
Secular equality is not a consideration’
23. These would also seem to be the sentiments 
of a retired High Court Chief Justice who regretfully told a citizen’s commission after 
the 2002 violence: ‘the Constitutional philosophy is now in the book only’ (Ravani, in 
Chenoy et al 2002: Appendix III). At one level then, the question that this essay began 
with- does Gujarat 2002 really represent a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the state- 
holds true. The paradigm has not changed from secularism to communalism in the 
state apparatus as many accounts suggest. Instead, it would appear to have shifted 
from a fuzzy, contested secular state to an increasingly unquestioned assertive Hindu 
rashtra. On the other hand, the nature of the state is highly complex. The position of 
the secular norm, even in a state structure as empirically and normatively communal 
as that of Gujarat should not be seen in stark black and white terms. The following 
points illustrate that secular principles still hold legitimacy for Gujarat, and for the 
Indian state in general.  
(a) The state-supported offensives against Christians in South Gujarat in 1998, and 
Muslims in 2002 drew widespread condemnation from NGOs, academics and the 
national and international media. One of the primary frames through which this 
condemnation was channelled was the state’s abuse of the secular norm. Thus, a 
post-1998 violence report indicated: ‘if any organisation or political party comes 
to believe, as the Sangh Parivar and the present Gujarat Government have, that 
they  can  attack  and  harass  any  community  with  religious  impunity,  the 
consequences  for  secularism  and  democracy  in  our  multi-religious  and 
heterogeneous  country  can  be  disastrous  (Chenoy  1999:  25).  Similarly,  before 
detailing minutely how Gujarat’s state apparatus had participated in the violence 
of 2002, the report of the Concerned Citizens tribunal began with the words: ‘what 
a shock and shame that India’s fair secular name should suffer dastardly disgrace 
through the recent government-abetted Gujarat communal rage (Iyer et al 2002: 
5). These reports express no doubt about the gross violation, even disowning of 
the secular norm by Gujarat’s state. Yet, they hold the state up against this norm. 
The latter then, even in the highly communal Gujarati state, is not irrelevant. In 
the backdrop of the 2002 massacre of Muslims, it has become especially relevant. 
Even in 2005, in national and international fora, the Gujarat government continues 
to be held accountable for giving up secularism in the violence of 2002. 
(b) Several  autonomous  constitutional  bodies  with  regulatory  functions  such  as 
India’s  Election  Commission,  Supreme  Court  and  the  National  Human  Rights 
Commission  (NHRC)  raised  serious  questions  about  the  Gujarat  state’s 
commitment  to  secularism  in  2002.  In  a  preliminary  report,  the  NHRC  for 
instance indicated that ‘grave questions arise of fidelity to the Constitution…’ 
(NHRC  2002:  20,xii).  ‘The  Commission  has….  been  struck  by  the  apparent 
failure  of  the  Government  of  Gujarat  to  follow  vigorously  the  ‘Guidelines  to 
Promote Communal Harmony’ issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs… (NHRC 
2002:  44).  Here,  the  state  is  being  censured  for  actions  it  has  been  partially 
complicit  in  for  decades.  In  fact,  the  Gujarat  state  has  continued  to  be 
                                                
23 Interviewed in October 2004, Ahmedabad QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 18     
   
discriminatory on grounds of religion beyond 2002. However, the extent of the 
violation  of the  secular  norm  in  2002  made  bodies  like  the  NHRC especially 
censorious of the Gujarat government. Like the riot reports on Gujarat by non-
state organisations, one of the frames through which the Gujarat government’s 
failures in 2002 were being measured by regulatory state bodies was constitutional 
secularism.  Significantly,  regulatory  bodies  like  the  NHRC  could  censure  the 
Gujarat state even as a BJP government was in power in the Indian capital. They 
derived their legitimacy from the Constitution and from the continuing relevance 
of its normative principles. 
(c) Drawing  on  criticism  from  non-state  and  national-level  state  bodies,  senior 
members  of  Gujarat’s  administrative  apparatus  have  spoken  out  against  the 
‘unconstitutional’ role of the state in the 2002 violence. A case in point is R.B. 
Shreekumar, an Indian Police Service officer who was in-charge of the Gujarat 
State  Intelligence  Bureau  from  April  to  September  2002.  In  March  2005, 
Shreekumar filed a petition before the Central administrative Tribunal, as well as 
his  third  affidavit  before  the  Shah-Nanavati  judicial  commission  that  is 
investigating the 2002 violence. A significant feature of these depositions is a 
register  of  ‘illegal  and  unconstitutional’  verbal  instructions  received  by 
Shreekumar from the Chief Minister, senior bureaucrats and police officers during 
the  Gujarat  violence.  For  instance,  he  was  asked  to  ‘desist  from  collecting 
evidence about the Sangh Parivar involvement in the 2002 violence, shift Muslim 
victims  of  the  riots  out  of  relief  camps,  give  false  information  to  the Central 
Election Commission about the communal situation in Gujarat, conceal data on 
lapses by government functionaries in preventing the violence, submit intelligence 
reports  against  Muslim  leaders,  ‘eliminate  Muslim  extremists’  who  were 
disturbing  the  communal  peace  of  Ahmedabad,  etc’.  (Sharma  2005,  Indian 
Express 2005a, BBC 2005). The Shreekumar case indicates that the national and 
international attention to governance lapses and the violation of the secular norm 
has even provided some renewed legitimacy to people inside the Gujarati state to 
hold up secularism in their everyday administrative practice. This is helped by the 
fact that there is a Congress government in Delhi from May 2004, even though 
Gujarat continues to be governed by the BJP.  
(d) Several victims of the 2002 violence have used the attention it has received to 
make clear their reservations about the Gujarat government’s handling of their 
complaints. In some instances, families of Muslims killed in the violence have 
pointed out to the High Court and NHRC that the public prosecutors appointed by 
the government to fight their court cases are Sangh Parivar men (Indian Express 
2005b). In the present political atmosphere, the government has been forced to re-
appoint some public prosecutors. Under orders of the Supreme Court and NHRC, 
it  has  also  had  to  re-open  cases  of  rioting  and  murder  against  Sangh  Parivar 
members, which had earlier been pushed under the carpet.  
(e) The aftermath of Gujarat 2002 discussed above, and the subsequent defeat of the 
BJP in the 2004 national elections, have renewed debate on secularism within the 
Sangh  Parivar.  One  section  of  the  Parivar  has  re-emphasised  its  anti-secular 
position.  Thus,  when  Gujarat’s  present  Finance  Minister,  Vajubhai  Vala  was 
appointed President of the State BJP, his inaugural speech stressed that ‘party men 
must unite to face the challenge posed by secularists’ (quoted in Times of India 
2005b, emphasis added). This challenge was assumed to have diminished in the 
1990s,  but  now  may  have  renewed  relevance.  At  the  other  end  of  the  Sangh 
Parivar spectrum are attempts, albeit weak, by leaders like A.B. Vajpayee and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 19     
   
L.K. Advani to change the image of the BJP to a right of centre party. This is seen 
as imperative in a liberal democracy where extreme Hindutva postures, such as 
those shown by the VHP and the BJP-led state government in Gujarat 2002, do 
not go down well with the electorate, or in international fora.  
The preceding five points indicate that at several levels, the secular norm still carries 
legitimacy in the context of the Gujarati state. If Gujarat had started on the path of 
Hindu rashtra from 1990, 2002 was both a high point of this project and the point that 
suggested that the ideas and actions of the nascent ‘Hindu rashtra’ had gone too far. 
The BJP government has been forced to show restraint in its anti-Muslim actions and 
rhetoric after 2002. At the same time, the Gujarat state is neither empirically nor 
normatively  secular  today.  Far  from  it.  One  can  confidently  say  though  that  the 
‘paradigm shift’ from secularism to communalism that some scholars suggested had 




6. Conclusion: 2002 and beyond- almost Hindu rashtra, but not quite 
 
The preceding pages have shown the Gujarati state to be multi-layered, complex, and 
embedded in society to different degrees at different levels. Two dimensions have 
been used to reveal the complexity of the state: (a) a politico-historical dimension that 
brings out continuities as well as changes in the state over a 45-year period, and (b) an 
analytical differentiation between the empirical and normative state that makes the 
study of the latter more layered. This multi-layered methodology has been used to 
study the state in situations of inter-religious violence. The question the essay asked 
was-  has  the  state’s  role  in  condoning  and  participating  in  mass  violence  against 
Muslims in 2002 heralded a shift from India’s secular constitutional state to a Hindu 
rashtra? The answer one is led up to is- not really. This section briefly summarises 
and re-visits the nuances behind this conclusion. 
 
From the sixties to the eighties, the Gujarati state more or less adhered to the secular 
constitutional ideal formally, even as individual members within it demonstrated wide 
empirical,  and  sometimes  even  normative  divergence  from  the  commitment  to 
secularism. The existence of the secular norm restrained the actions of even those 
state actors who were deeply embedded in ethnic social identities. The state’s fuzzy 
but significant engagement with secularism began to change in the aftermath of the 
KHAM  versus  savarna  Hindu  identity  contest of  the early  and  mid-eighties.  This 
contest shifted the political support of Gujarat’s upper and middle caste Hindus away 
from  the  Congress.  They  now  found  an  anchor  in  the  Hindu  supremacist  Sangh 
Parivar and the BJP. By the late 1980s, a weak state- deeply infiltrated by Hindutva 
ideology and supporters, and a de-institutionalised Congress party were increasingly 
indifferent, sometimes even complicit  in inter-religious  violence  that accompanied 
Hindutva mobilisation programmes. At the same time, the rhetoric of secularism was 
kept up. By the late eighties then, the gap between the actions of the empirical state 
and the rhetoric of the normatively secular state- never non-existent in independent 
Gujarat- had widened.  
 
From  1990,  and  especially  after  1995  when  the  BJP  came  to  power  in  Gujarat 
independently,  the  state  under  a  Hindu  nationalist  government  stopped  projecting 
normative secularism. It unabashedly supported Sangh Parivar affiliates in violence QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS131  Page 20     
   
against Muslim and Christian minorities, and did nothing to change its image of being 
a Hindu rashtra in the making. It would appear that Hindu rashtra was achieved in 
2002 when the state participated at every possible level in launching a mass offensive 
against Muslims. At one level then, Gujarat 2002 indeed represented a paradigm shift. 
This shift did not come about in 2002 alone. Throughout the BJP’s rule, Gujarat’s 
state disavowed the secular principle. Not only was this state empirically unsecular, as 
it had been on a much smaller scale in previous decades; it even gave up on the 
secular norm. The latter- normative shift in the nature of the state- might be perceived 
as paradigmatic. At the same time, one would still hesitate to term Gujarat’s highly 
communal empirical state of 2002 ‘paradigmatic’. After all, stark expressions like the 
latter portray events without precedent. The ‘paradigmatic’ thesis for the empirical 
state  encourages  misconceptions  about  previous  political-governmental  formations 
and about the nature of the state, which is institutionalised. As another scholar of the 
Indian state has pointed out, ‘the character of the state is neither firmly fixed nor 
constantly changing. Similarities and dissimilarities occur across both time and space 
(Jayal 2001: 104, fn5). Terms like paradigmatic then, do not have the scope to show 
extremely  significant  changes  in  degree  and  severity  in  an  entity  that  also  elicits 
structural continuity. They represent the black and white. 
 
At another level, even the shaded ‘paradigmatic shift’ in the nature of the normative 
state portrayed above, needs to be qualified. Everyday instances of state biases against 
non-Hindus have continued. But, reprimands over the unsecular role of the state in 
2002 have reined in Gujarat’s government. The formal secular framework has acted 
as  a  check  against  attempts  to  portray  Gujarat  as  a  Hindu  rashtra  or  carry  out  a 
massacre akin to that of 2002. Since constitutional norms are a continuing point of 
reference, Gujarat may have come close to seeming like a Hindu nation-state in 2002, 
but  it  cannot  really  be  called  a  Hindu  rashtra  today.  Then,  the  significant  and 
important  shift  in  the  nature  of  the  state  that  Gujarat  2002  represents  is  neither 
paradigmatic  nor  complete.  The  nature  of  the  Gujarat  state,  as  indeed  any  state, 
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